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A good  understanding  of  narkets targeted by energy  policy  is  necessary  for
energy  tax policy to be successful  .  This paper  analyzes  coal, natural gas and
oil  narkets to deternine the extent to which these fuel  prices nove together.
lle find  that there ]yas  a stable long-run relationship between  coal and  oil
prices until  19/4  and  that this  relationship changed  after  1974, The  long-run
relationship found between  coal  , natural gas  and  oil  prices inplies that a
single-fuel tax in these  narkets would  not be effective as a single tax
Policy.  Sinilarly,  an equal percentage  tax on these  energy  sources,  which
does  not change  relative  prices initially,  would  not keep  relative prices
unchanged  in  the long run.  0ur  results show  that  energy  policy  nust take
account  of the long-run relationship between  different  energy  prices.
0therwise, the Iong-run  results of energy  policy could  be quite different  than
i  ntended  .
I.  INTRODUCTION
Government  energy  po1  icies generally  have  multiple  objectives  which  are
not necessarily  compatible  and  are not always  fulfilled,  For  energy  po1  icy to
be successful  , a good  understanding  of the rnarkets  targeted by po1  icy is
necessary.  In particular, the long-run  relationship  between  energy  prices
will  determine  the degree  of success  of any  pol  icy which  targets  a particular
energy  s  ource.
If  the goal  of energy  tax po1  icy is to change  the consumption  of a
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Reserve  Bank  of Dal  I  as.particular  enengy  source  because  of environmental  concerns,  then the fuel
which  pollutes  most  should  be  taxed  the heaviest. If  the goal is energy
security, the po1  icy should  decrease  consumption  while increasing  production
of the targeted fuel  .  The  Clinton admi  n  i strati on'  s Btu tax proposal  was
initially  hai'led  as a tax to curb pollution and  promote  energy  security, but
the proposed  tax rates were  not consistent  with either goal  .  Coal  and  natural
gas  were  taxed at equal  rates, although  natural gas is  clearly the cleaner
burning  fuel  , and  oil  was  taxed  at twice that rate,  However,  if  the goal of
energy  taxation is only to raise revenue,  then the tax should  be structured so
as not to change  relative energy  prices and  consumption  patterns.
Whether  or not coal  , natural gas and  oil  prices have  a long-run
relationship will  be important  in determining  the success  of energy  po1  icy,  In
this paper,  we  investigate  whether  such  a long-run  rel  ationship  exists, and
whether  the relationship  has  changed  over  the years.  Then,  depending  on  the
goals  of energy  policy, our analysis  can  cast a light on  whether  the policy
wi-ll achieve  its  intended  qoals.
II.  COAL,  NATURAL  GAS  AND  OIL MARKETS
Whether  coal  , natural  gas  and  oi1 prices  are related  in the long  run
depends  on whether  they are ciose substitutes for each  other.  If  the three
fuels serve  the same  markets,  they are closer substitutes and  one  price will
ref.lect movements  in the other prices.
Coal  , natural gas  and  oil  constitute nore than 88 percent  of total  U.S.
energy  consumption,  of which  23.8  percent  is imports, The  United  States  is
re1  atively self sufficient in coai and  natural  gas, exporting  l3 percent  of
coal production  and  importing  only 9,2 percent  of natural  gas  consumed,  TheUnited  States  is somewhat  more  rel  iant on  world  suppl  ies of oil,  importing
44.7  percent  of the total oil  and  products  consumed  domestically.
The  markets  that these  fuels serve, and  the fuel  baiance  of U.S. energy
consumption  has  changed  substantially since the end  of the second  world war.
From  accounting  for  almost  50 percent  of energy  consumption  in 1947,  coal use
has  declined  to 23.5  percent  of total energy  consumption  in 1990. Oil's share
in consumption  has increased  somewhat,  from  34.4 percent  of consumption  to
41.3 percent  of consumption.  Natural  gas  has  made  some  inroads, increasing
from 16 percent  of total  energy  consumption  in 1947  to near  24 percent  in  1990
(see  Figure  1)  .1
Aside from  changing  shares  in energy  consumption,  the fuels'  end-use
markets  have  also changed. As Figure  2 shows,  coal dominated  the industrial
market  in the 1940's  with a 55 percent  share,  with natural gas  comprising  23
percent  of industrjai fuel input.  In 1990,  oil  and  natural  gas  were  competing
for the industrial market  and  coal use  had  shifted  mainly  to electricity
generation. Coal's  share  in electricity generation  has  always  been  high, but
it  increased  in the past  few  years  as  natural  gas  and  oil's  shares  declined.
In 1990,  86 percent  of all  coal consumed  was  used  in electricity generation
Figure  3).  In 1947,  coal also  dominated  the residential  and  commercial  end-
use  markets  with a 48  percent  share. The  picture  has  changed  significantly
since  then  as Figure  4 shows.  Coal's  share  in the residential and  commercial
sector  has  dwindled  to one-tenth  of one  percent,  while  the share  of natural
gas  has  increased  from  15.7  to 46.6  Dercent. The  share  of oil  in the
residential  and  commercial  market  has  been  halved  in the past 45 years to 14
percent  of the market.  z
One  sector where  the three fuels are clearly no longer competitive  isthe transportation  sector  (Figure  5).  Coal  and  oil  were  competing  fuels in
the transportation  sector  in the 1940's,  coal  with 34.4  percent  of the narket,
and  oil  with 65.3  percent  of the rnarket, In 1990,  the share  of coal in
transportation  was  zero, and  ojl  had  grabbed  96 percent  of the market.
Natural  gas  had  a measly  3.7 percent  share.  The  share  of natural gas is
projected  to grow,  as a result of pollution and  natjonal security concerns
about  U.  S. oil  dependence.
I  I I.  EI,IPIRICAL  ANALYSIS
To examine  whether  or not coal  , natural gas  and  oii  prices move
together, time series methods  are utilized,  lle first  check  whether  the price
series are stationary, and  find that all  of them  have  stochastic  trends (or
are integrated),  For each  of the series, we  then test  for cointegration.
Estination and  testing uses  annual  data from 1947  to 1990. lle use
minemouth  prices  for bituminous  coal and  lignite for the coal price variable,
U.S.  crude  oil  price at the wellhead  for oil,  and  wellhead  prices  for natural
gas.3  All prices  are  converted  to a dollars per Btu  basis.There  have  been
structural changes  in the oil  market  during  1947-1990  time  period.  0PEC
became  a much  more  potent force in the wor1d  oil  market  after the ear'ly
seventies. The  end  of 1973  and  beginning  of 1974  were  tumultuous  times  in the
oil  market. In october  1973,  oPEC  raised  the price of oil  by 70  percent.  By
January  1974,  the pr'ice  of oil  had  tripled to more  than  $11.00  per barrel  .
These  dramatic  changes  in the oil  market  could  change  the relationship  between
coal  , oil  and  gas  prices (see  Figure  6).  Therefore,  in addition  to using  the
ful  I  sample,  we  divide the sample  period  up into two  sub-samples,  1948  to 1974
and  1975  to 1990  to see  whether  the relationship between  coal  , gas  and  oilprices has  changed  over the two periods.
A.  I  ntegrati  on
As an initial  step in our econometric  work, we  checked  whether  our price
series }rere  integrated  or stationary,  A time series which  is  integrated is
said to have  a stochastic trend or a unit root,  A non-stationary,  integrated
series  signifies that any  shock  to the time  series  v{ill be  permanent,  Unl  ike
a stationary series which  reverts back  to  its  mean  after  a shock,  an
integrated time series will  not revert back  to its  pre-shock  level even  in the
long  run,
Applying  conventional  econometric  techniques  to an integrated  time
series  can  give rise to misleading  results.l  Therefore,  we  tested  fot"
integration  with both  an  augmented  Dickey-Ful'ler  and  a Phill  ips-Perron  test,
lle checked  for  integration with and  without a linear time trend for  the fuil
sample  (1947-1990)  and  for the two  subsamples  (1947-1974;  1975-1990)  and  found
the series  to be integrated  in all  cases. Al1 price series  were  integrated  of
order  one, i.e.,  the first  differences  of all  series  were  stationary. Table  I
reports  the augrnented  Dickey-Fuller  statistics testing for the nu11  hypothesis
that each  series is inteqrated.
B.  Coi  ntegrati  on
After determining  that each  price series was  integrated  of order one,  we
tested the three prices described  for cointegration.  Two  integrated  time
series  are called cointegrated  if  they  move  together.  Cointegration  implies  a
stationary,  long-run  relationship  between  the two  series  and  the cointegrating
term provides  information  about  the long-run  relationship.  Furthermore,  ifcointegration is not accounted  for,  any  model  involving the two  cointegrated
variables would  be misspecified  and/or  the parameter  estimates  could be
underest  i  mated.5 lle ernpl  oyed  the Johansen  procedure  to estimate  the
cointegrating  relationship  between  coal  , natural  gas  and  oil  prices.6
The  cointegration  relationships  varied  with the sample  periods. lrle
found  no cointegration among  the variables for  the fu'll  sample,  1947  to 1990.
The  lack of cointegration in the fu1  I  sample  is natural if  the sub- samples
have  completely  different cointegrating  relationships. This is indeed  the
case.  For the subsample  period 1947  -  1974,  we  find  a cointegrating
relationship  between  coal and  oi1, and  for the subsample  period  1974-1990,  we
find a cointegrating  re1  ationship  between  all  the three  variables.
Because  each  estimated  cointegrating  re1  ationship  is stationary,  the
cointegrating  terms  provide  an  efficjent estimate  of the long-run
relationships  between  the cointegrated  variables.  In the 1947-1974  sub-
sample  only the prices  of coal and  ojl  are  cointegrated, This inplies that a
one  percent  increase  in the price of oil  will  be  met  by a B percent  increase
in the price of coal in the long  run.  Similarly, a one  percent  increase  in
the price of coal  will  be  met  by a l/B percent  increase  in the price of oil  in
the long  run.  In our test, F is less than  one,  implying  that the change  in
the price of coal is less than  the change  in the price of oil.
As  Table  2 shows,  a permanent  one  percent  increase  in the price of oi1
brings  about  a 0.63  percent  increase  in coal  prices.  This  result is
consistent  with our knowledge  of these  two  markets. Prices  in the coal
industry were  largely based  on long-term  contracts, vrhich  were  of the order of
thirty years  or more,  and  hence  would  be  less variable  than  oil  prices.  The
onset  of pollution regulations  in the coal industry  in 1969  and  the early1970s  could  also be  a factor jn the smaller  changes  in coal  prices,  Eecause
coal is  a dirtier  fuel  , consumers  may  not be switching  out of oil  into coal  ,
and  equilibrium  is reached  without  coal prices  risjng as  much.  Another
argument  could be that productivity in the coal sector was  increasing
drastically, and-hence  coal prices  did not go  up  as  much  to get back  into long
run eouilibrium.
The  natural gas  market  was  a heavily regulated  market  in the 1947-1974
period,  and  this is likely the major  cause  for the lack of cointegration
between  natural gas  and  the other fuels in the first  subsample.  l,lellhead
prices of natura'l  gas  were  regulated  in 1954,  with the price of natural gas
based  on average  historical  costs. This regulated  price was  below  the market
value of natural gas in the 1960s  and  1970s  and  was  quite unrespons.ive  to
market  forces.  Moreover,  natural gas, like  coal  , was  sold under  long-term
contracts  which  likely  contributed  to the lack of cointegration  of gas  with
coal and  oil.
In the second  subsample  period 1974  - 1990,  the results are
qualitativeiy similar to the first  subsample  although  we  find cointegration
between  all  three  varjables, Because  it  was  difficult  to identify the changes
in the prices  from  the three-price  cointegrating  rejatjonship,  t.le  also checked
for pairwise  cointegration  in this subsample.
To obtain a lower  and  upper  bound  for the changes  in coal and  natural
gas  prices, given  a change  in the price of oi1, we  assume  one  of the prices
stays constant  and  calcul  ate how  the other price would  have  to respond  to a
change  in the oil  price in order  to return  to long-run  equil  ibrium.  If  the
price of oil  jncreases  by one  percent,  holding  the price of natural  gas
constant,  coal prices  would  have  to fall  by I.6 percent  to get back  to long-run
9as
equil  ibrium.  0n  the other  hand,  if  coal prices  are kept  constant,  natural
prices  would  have  to increase  by 0.75  percent  to be  back  at equi'l  ibrium.
The  above  experiment  seems  to suggest  that as oil  prices increase,  there
is not much  substitution  into coal  .  If  the price of natural  gas  falls
relative to oii  (i,e.  natural  gas  prices kept  constant),  consuners  rrould  shift
into gas  from  oil.  But, since  the price of coal has  to fall  to get back  into
equi  librium, consuners  must  be  shifting out of coal into gas.  This  could  come
about  if  gas  was  perceived  to be a better substitute for  oi'l than coal  .  0n
the other hand,  there probably  is not be  nuch  shifting  out of gas into coal  ,
because  the price of natural gas  has  to rise  to return to the long-run
equi  I  i  brium  relationship.
In the pairriise  cointegration  tests for the 1974  -1990  period,  we  find
sonewhat  similar results. l.lhen  oil  is paired  with natural  gas,  we  find a  B of
1.129. This implies  that a one  percent  change  in the price of oil,  r{ould  lead
to a 0.89  percent  change  in the price of natural  gas  in the long  run.  Oil and
natural  gas  are relatively good  substitutes,  and  the p values  close  to 1.0 are
consi  stent  with this fact.
l,lhen  coal and  oil  are paired together, the cointegrating relationship is
sinilar to the one  found  in the earl  ier subsample.  As  Table  2 shows,  if  the
price of oil  increased  by  one  percent,  the price of coal  would  have  to
increase  by 0.535  percent  to bring the relationship  back  into equilibrium,
although  this p vaiue  is not significant.  The  F in the later sample  is
somewhat  smaller  than  the  F in the earl  ier sample,  possibly  implying  that oil
and  coal have  begun  to serve  more  diverse markets.
Finally, if  coal and  natural  gas  are paired  together,  we  see  that the
pairwise  relationship  is quite similar to the three-price  cointegratingrelationship.  A one  percent  change  in the price of coal  would  lead  to a 0.5
percent  change  in the price of natural gas in the long run, same  as in the
earl  ier result, when  oil  prices  were  held  constant. This seems  to imply  that
in the later subsample,  1974-1990,  the price of coal did not affect oi1 prices
much. This finding is consistent  with the insignificant  p we  found  in the
coal  -oil  rel  ationshi  o above.
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSION
A good  understanding  of markets  targeted by energy  policy is necessary
for  energy  tax pol  icy to be successful  .  Given  that we  find  a long-run
relationship  between  coal  , natural  gas  and  oil  prices, it  is imperative  that
energy  tax po1  icy take  account  of this relationship,  otherwise  the long-run
results of energy  po1  icy could  be  quite different than intended.
The  iong-run relationship that we  found  between  coal  , natural gas  and
oil  markets  suggests  that a single-fuel  tax in these  markets  would  not be
effective as a single-fuel  pol  icy,  Because  all  three  markets  are
cointegrated,  a tax on  any  single  fuel would  be  reflected  in other  fuel prices
in the l  ong  run.
If  the goal of energy  tax po1  icy is to only raise revenue,  the best tax
would  be  one  which  did not change  the long-run  relationship  between  the fuels,
assuming  that we  are initially  at a long-run  equilibrium. The  least
disruptive  tax would  be  to tax oil  and  natural  gas  at relatively similar
rates, and  tax coal at half that rate.  In such  a case,  the tax would  not
disturb the consumption  patterns  in the coal  , natural  gas  and  oil  markets. An
equal  percentage  tax on these  energy  sources,  which  does  not change  relative
prices initially,  would  not keep  relative prices  unchanged  in the long  run.0n  the other  hand,  if  the goal is to alter energy  prices' it  is not
necessary  to tax ail  fuels in order  to change  their prices, given  the
cointegration  between  coal  , natural  gas  and  oil  prices.  A politically
feasible tax on one  fue'l could be used  to change  prices and  consumption
patterns of other fue'ls.  For example,  a gasol  ine tax which  is  relatively  easy
to administer  and  collect, has  a predictable  impact  on  oil  prices.  A change
in the gasoline  tax, working  through  the oil  price, will  also  change  the
prices of natural gas and  coa.l  in a manner  dictated by the long-run
cointegrating  relationship  between  the fuels.  Knowledge  of the cointegrating
relationship between  energy  sources  will  be helpful in ensuring  that energy
po1  icy achieves  its  intended  goals  in the long  run.
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I1Table l.  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  Tests for Unit Roots
1947  -  1990 t947 -  t974 1974  -  1990
T T- T T T t_
COAL -5.  t9 -7  .72 0.154 17.89 0  .893 -9  .64
NAT  GAS -7.51 -22.tl' -1.00 -3.92 -2.68 -0.918
OIL -5.25 -  15.00 -7  .79 -  15.  10 -3.59 -3.54
The  above  statistics are for testing the null hypothesis  that each  variable
contains  a unit root.  T..  is without  a I  inear  deterministic  time  trend  and
r,  is with a linear deteiministic  time  trend.  A11,  except  the 
' 
component,
are insignificant at the 10  percent  level  .
t2Table  2.  Cointegration  of Coal  , Natural  cas and  Oil Prices
Cointegration Between  the Three Fuels
1947  -  t974  1975  -  1990
B  siS.  B  sig.
Coal  1.0  .01  1.0  .045
Natural gas  .244  .30  2.087  .000
0i  I  .628  .007  -1.569  .000
Pairwise  Cointeoration  1975-  1990
P  sis.
Natural Gas  - Coal  .466  .001
Coal  - Oil  .535  >.20
Oil - Natural  Gas  1.129  .000
l31.1'luclear  energy  which  was  nonexistent  in 1947  now  accounts  for 8 percent  of
total  energy  consumption  (21 percent  of electricity  generation  is from  nuclear
fuel  s).
2.The  rel  ati  ve
percent  of the
which  coal is
share  of coal is actually greater than 0.1 percent.  Twenty  one
residential/commercial  market  is serviced  by electricity,  of
the main  energy  source.
3.The  coal  data is from  l/istorical Statistics of the  U.S,  published  by the
U.S. Department  of Conmerce,  Bureau  of the Census;  The  U.S. CoaI  Industry,
1970-1990:  Two  Decades  of Change  published  by the U.S. Energy  Information
Administration,  Department  of Energy;  and  Coal  Data:  A Reference,  published  by
the Energy  Information  Administration,  Department  of Energy. The  natural gas
and  oil  data are from  the lil  and  Gas  iJournal  Energy  Database.
4. See  Balke (1991),  Sims,  Stock  and  !,atson  (1990)  and  Stock  and  llatson
(  ls88)  .
S.See  Engle  and  Yoo  (1987).
6.  The  Johansen  procedure  is a maximum  likelihood  method.  lle  chose  it  over
severa]  other procedures  because  it  provides  the most  efficient  estimates  of
the cointegrating  relationships. In addition, it  provides  estimates  of the
number  of cointegrating  re1  ationships. The  cointegration  tests were  done
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